Hmm. Seems more likely to me that the respondents felt constrained by what we know of the situation: no ticking bomb, lots of innocent people rounded up in sweeps, etc. Given the constraints of the facts of the matter, how easy is it to justify the woman jauntily pointing at the naked hooded dude's balls?
Actually, far as I can tell, the question was "Are There Circumstances in Which This Type of Behavior by U.S. Soldiers Is Justified?" It's only the gloss that introduces "imagine."
Duly noted in the update. But I think the "are there circumstances" language clearly suggests the counterfactual question "are there possible states of affairs that would, if actual, justify..." (as opposed to "were the circumstances there such as to justify...?").
They may be evil, but they're completely reliable.
"jauntily" is just the right word, baa.
One wonders (no, one really doesn't...) if pointing at genitals in a jaunty way requires the presence of various attitudes that aren't directly voluntary. It seems like we've got a kind of toxin puzzle looming, if so.
"Toxin X is a substance that will make you violently ill for a few hours. However, it has no long term effects of any kind. As an experiment in psychology, I'm offering you a million dollars if tonight at midnight you fully intend to drink toxin X by tomorrow at noon. You don't actually have to drink the toxin; all you have to do is to intend to drink it. Your intention will be tested by a device similar to a polygraph which my people have developed and which has been shown to be 100% accurate. If at midnight you have the intention, a million will be wired to your bank account. The only other conditions are that you are to make no bets, do anything that will cause you to become irrational, or arrange for any way to avoid the effects of the toxin."
Suppose you decide that being ill for one day is a reasonable price to pay for a million dollars. Your first thought is to therefore agree to the proposal. It then occurs to you that you won't even have to become sick in order to win the money. All you have to do is to intend to drink the toxin. You don't actually have to carry out your intention.
But now if you know ahead of time that you don't actually have to drink the toxin, then you can't really intend to drink it. So you tell yourself you really do have to drink it. But then if at midnight you really did intend to drink the toxin, and you got the million, then come the next day you would no longer have any reason to drink it: you've already been paid and drinking the toxin would make you unnecessarily sick.
Is there any way for you to win the money?
The answer to the question is clearly yes: just drink the toxin. But you'll have to explain how this pertains to ballpointing.
ogged: the answer, sadly, is no, at least for rational agents who forego 'side bets.' Being a rational agent, you are aware that drinking the toxin is irrational (you perform an action that there is no reason to perform, and good reason not to perform), and so you cannot intend to drink. Were you to intend, you would knowingly be committed to an action you have good reason not to perform, and this isn't compatible with your rationality. (Supposing that you stay rational, the commitment might not even be stable enough to count as an intention.)
Gauthier has some weird views on this, as does Ted H. That's for another time.
The tie-in to the jaunty testicles is like this. Suppose that pointing jauntily requires certain attitudes, for example, a kind of carefree joy taken at the sight of Iraqi testicles. An evil demon threatening to destroy the world unless you so point would be a powerful consideration in favor of having that carefree joy-- but it would be the wrong kind of reason. Think of Pascal's wager: if right, it gives you reason to want to believe in God, but not the right kind of reason (i.e., evidence, or reasons having to do with the truth of the claim that God exists). The reasons that govern jauntiness concern the objects of the attitudes, in this case the testicles in question. The fact that there's a big payoff for being jaunty is not the right sort of reason, and so it looks as though it's impossible for a certain kind of rational agent to save the world.
I'm sure there are all sorts of well-established and clever points in the literature of which I'm ignorant, but I'd say this: you can't separate the intention from the action, it's nonsensical: intentions are in principle unknowable (real question: what's an intention?) prior to the intended action. The only way to intend to drink the toxin is to actually drink it. Knowing the nature of the relationship between intention and action, a rational actor who preferred the money to the lack of pain would, in fact, drink up.
Actually, the best argument for why getting the money is impossible (for rational agents, etc.) rests on the idea that
you can't separate the intention from the action
and in particular that the rationality of forming an intention rests on the rationality of the relevant intention.
The problem with your line, I think, is that (a) at noon you will have no reason to drink and (b) you know this to be true at midnight. So to intend to drink, you'd have to tell yourself, in effect, that you'll do something irrational, and rational agents can't do that. They can take crazy pills, of course, but they can't maintain rationality and intend to do things that aren't rational.
Gauthier argues, more or less, that a rational action is one that's part of a rational plan. Intending-getting the money-drinking the toxin is a rational plan, and so, contrary to appearances, drinking IS rational. This is just kooky, I think.
ogged: by hypothesis in this puzzle intentions are knowable prior to the actions, which renders the whole thing nuts.
FL: Is "intending" supposed to be a discrete step in that plan? Like, first I'll intend to drink the toxin, then I'll drink it? Who decides to intend to do something? Also, what is this supposed to demonstrate? (And wouldn't drinking while being tested as ogged suggests work?)
ogged, ben W, if you don't believe fontana's argument, I'm going to kill a puppy.
But seriously, there is equivocation about 'intention' here that confuses the case. If intend means "have a subjecive pro-attitude (or something) towards an action," then you can clearly 'intend' to drink the poison. Also, recall that it's supposed to be a contradition in this example simply to *drink the poison* without the money as reason. You're rational. Drinking the poison without reason is not something a rational person does). If you buy that you can't drink the poison at midnight without a reason, then the intention aspect of the argument becomes more palatable.
The reason to drink the toxin is that it's impossible to "intend" without doing. If I have to have the intent at midnight, then I drink at midnight. That's "rational" because it's the only way to get the money.
But see, I think it's FL's position (or the position of this example) that as a rational agent you can't drink the toxin once your 'reason' expires. The intent stuff is just window dressing on the case.
Ok, that's well explained. If I have to drink at noon, I agree that it's impossible to get the money. But the reason I'd give is that there's no fact of the matter regarding intentions. We do recognize conditional intentions, but it's not clear to me that we actually believe in them. Ever not done something you "intended" to do only to have someone say, "you were never going to do it anyway."?
Once again, the interesting question is, "what's an intention?"
Hmm. Seems more likely to me that the respondents felt constrained by what we know of the situation: no ticking bomb, lots of innocent people rounded up in sweeps, etc. Given the constraints of the facts of the matter, how easy is it to justify the woman jauntily pointing at the naked hooded dude's balls?
Posted by ogged | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 3:15 PM
Well, it's "can you imagine..." not "were the actual circumstances such as to justify..."
Abandon the constraints of the facts!
Posted by FL | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 3:36 PM
Actually, far as I can tell, the question was "Are There Circumstances in Which This Type of Behavior by U.S. Soldiers Is Justified?" It's only the gloss that introduces "imagine."
Posted by ogged | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 3:43 PM
Evil demons are always threatening to blow up the world if I don't jauntily point at testicles. My own, neghbors, you name it.
Curse you Demogorgon!
Posted by baa | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 3:53 PM
Duly noted in the update. But I think the "are there circumstances" language clearly suggests the counterfactual question "are there possible states of affairs that would, if actual, justify..." (as opposed to "were the circumstances there such as to justify...?").
Posted by FL | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 3:54 PM
language clearly suggests the counterfactual question
Agreed.
But why do you think the evil demons will honor their bargain?
Posted by ogged | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 3:56 PM
They may be evil, but they're completely reliable.
"jauntily" is just the right word, baa.
One wonders (no, one really doesn't...) if pointing at genitals in a jaunty way requires the presence of various attitudes that aren't directly voluntary. It seems like we've got a kind of toxin puzzle looming, if so.
This is so much more fun than grading.
Posted by FL | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 4:04 PM
This is what googling "toxin puzzle" finds:
"Toxin X is a substance that will make you violently ill for a few hours. However, it has no long term effects of any kind. As an experiment in psychology, I'm offering you a million dollars if tonight at midnight you fully intend to drink toxin X by tomorrow at noon. You don't actually have to drink the toxin; all you have to do is to intend to drink it. Your intention will be tested by a device similar to a polygraph which my people have developed and which has been shown to be 100% accurate. If at midnight you have the intention, a million will be wired to your bank account. The only other conditions are that you are to make no bets, do anything that will cause you to become irrational, or arrange for any way to avoid the effects of the toxin."
Suppose you decide that being ill for one day is a reasonable price to pay for a million dollars. Your first thought is to therefore agree to the proposal. It then occurs to you that you won't even have to become sick in order to win the money. All you have to do is to intend to drink the toxin. You don't actually have to carry out your intention.
But now if you know ahead of time that you don't actually have to drink the toxin, then you can't really intend to drink it. So you tell yourself you really do have to drink it. But then if at midnight you really did intend to drink the toxin, and you got the million, then come the next day you would no longer have any reason to drink it: you've already been paid and drinking the toxin would make you unnecessarily sick.
Is there any way for you to win the money?
The answer to the question is clearly yes: just drink the toxin. But you'll have to explain how this pertains to ballpointing.
Posted by ogged | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 4:23 PM
I also have some boxes for you to open, ogged...
Posted by baa | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 5:02 PM
baa: hahahaha.
ogged: the answer, sadly, is no, at least for rational agents who forego 'side bets.' Being a rational agent, you are aware that drinking the toxin is irrational (you perform an action that there is no reason to perform, and good reason not to perform), and so you cannot intend to drink. Were you to intend, you would knowingly be committed to an action you have good reason not to perform, and this isn't compatible with your rationality. (Supposing that you stay rational, the commitment might not even be stable enough to count as an intention.)
Gauthier has some weird views on this, as does Ted H. That's for another time.
The tie-in to the jaunty testicles is like this. Suppose that pointing jauntily requires certain attitudes, for example, a kind of carefree joy taken at the sight of Iraqi testicles. An evil demon threatening to destroy the world unless you so point would be a powerful consideration in favor of having that carefree joy-- but it would be the wrong kind of reason. Think of Pascal's wager: if right, it gives you reason to want to believe in God, but not the right kind of reason (i.e., evidence, or reasons having to do with the truth of the claim that God exists). The reasons that govern jauntiness concern the objects of the attitudes, in this case the testicles in question. The fact that there's a big payoff for being jaunty is not the right sort of reason, and so it looks as though it's impossible for a certain kind of rational agent to save the world.
Sublime and ridiculous, all in one.
Posted by FL | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 9:08 PM
the answer, sadly, is no
I'm sure there are all sorts of well-established and clever points in the literature of which I'm ignorant, but I'd say this: you can't separate the intention from the action, it's nonsensical: intentions are in principle unknowable (real question: what's an intention?) prior to the intended action. The only way to intend to drink the toxin is to actually drink it. Knowing the nature of the relationship between intention and action, a rational actor who preferred the money to the lack of pain would, in fact, drink up.
Posted by ogged | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 9:18 PM
Actually, the best argument for why getting the money is impossible (for rational agents, etc.) rests on the idea that
you can't separate the intention from the action
and in particular that the rationality of forming an intention rests on the rationality of the relevant intention.
The problem with your line, I think, is that (a) at noon you will have no reason to drink and (b) you know this to be true at midnight. So to intend to drink, you'd have to tell yourself, in effect, that you'll do something irrational, and rational agents can't do that. They can take crazy pills, of course, but they can't maintain rationality and intend to do things that aren't rational.
Gauthier argues, more or less, that a rational action is one that's part of a rational plan. Intending-getting the money-drinking the toxin is a rational plan, and so, contrary to appearances, drinking IS rational. This is just kooky, I think.
Posted by FL | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 10:42 PM
I don't have to drink at noon, just by noon, which means I can drink when I'm being tested.
Posted by ogged | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 10:46 PM
ogged: by hypothesis in this puzzle intentions are knowable prior to the actions, which renders the whole thing nuts.
FL: Is "intending" supposed to be a discrete step in that plan? Like, first I'll intend to drink the toxin, then I'll drink it? Who decides to intend to do something? Also, what is this supposed to demonstrate? (And wouldn't drinking while being tested as ogged suggests work?)
Posted by ben wolfson | Link to this comment | 05-11-04 11:38 PM
ogged, ben W, if you don't believe fontana's argument, I'm going to kill a puppy.
But seriously, there is equivocation about 'intention' here that confuses the case. If intend means "have a subjecive pro-attitude (or something) towards an action," then you can clearly 'intend' to drink the poison. Also, recall that it's supposed to be a contradition in this example simply to *drink the poison* without the money as reason. You're rational. Drinking the poison without reason is not something a rational person does). If you buy that you can't drink the poison at midnight without a reason, then the intention aspect of the argument becomes more palatable.
Posted by baa | Link to this comment | 05-12-04 5:42 AM
The reason to drink the toxin is that it's impossible to "intend" without doing. If I have to have the intent at midnight, then I drink at midnight. That's "rational" because it's the only way to get the money.
Posted by ogged | Link to this comment | 05-12-04 9:47 AM
But see, I think it's FL's position (or the position of this example) that as a rational agent you can't drink the toxin once your 'reason' expires. The intent stuff is just window dressing on the case.
Posted by baa | Link to this comment | 05-12-04 12:08 PM
Can I just note that Heidegger is crystal fucking clear compared to this?
By "'reason'" baa, do you mean my rational faculty or my motivation?
Posted by ogged | Link to this comment | 05-12-04 12:57 PM
[redacted]
Posted by [redacted] | Link to this comment | 05-12-04 1:26 PM
Ok, that's well explained. If I have to drink at noon, I agree that it's impossible to get the money. But the reason I'd give is that there's no fact of the matter regarding intentions. We do recognize conditional intentions, but it's not clear to me that we actually believe in them. Ever not done something you "intended" to do only to have someone say, "you were never going to do it anyway."?
Once again, the interesting question is, "what's an intention?"
Posted by ogged | Link to this comment | 05-12-04 1:46 PM