a) Why "oddly enough"? Unless your a hardcore nature determinist, the idea seems fairly mundane that increased mental practice would lead to increased mental ability.
b) This has some odd ramifications on the reason why we don't execute retarded people. I had assumed the reason was that retarded people were judged to not be responsible for their actions. If M Atkins is sentenced to death, it will mean that we simply do not execute retarded people because there is something wrong with the act of killing a retarded person as opposed to a person of normal intelligence. This is odd. Typically, the less intelligent the animal, the less moral justification required to OK its murder. Maybe, though, we're not so far from the supersitious belief the the mentally handicapped are touched by the gods.
Maybe Unf can clear things up. Or I suppose I could look up the ruling myself. Yeah, that might be faster...
I like the combination of an interesting issue and an Unf dig.
This issue has come up in cases where, say, an inmate has been mentally incapacitated as the result of a prison injury-- competent at the time of the crime, not at the time of punishment. I think the rationale is that the punishment can't be understood as punishment for past action, but this is totally off the top of my head. I've been meaning to look this up, though, since it's an important question.
Unlike Labs, I haven't been meaning to look this up, but his memory accords with mine. In the Rickey Ray Rector case was not his responsibility at the time of the crime--his brain damage came from his shooting himself in the head after killing the policeman, IIRC--but his inability to understand the punishment. Apparently he saved some of his last meal for the next day.
I don't think "oddly enough" means here that it's odd that this would be the case, but that the whole situation is odd.
I also don't think that it makes me proud in our advanced society that we're talking about whether we get to execute a man because his IQ went from 59 to 76 after his trial. Life in prison should be good enough.
It depends on what theory of imprisonment/punishment is operative. I don't think it makes sense to execute someone who was mentally incompetent at the time of commission of the crime, or to execute someone who has become mentally incompetent following commission of the crime. But I also don't think it makes sense to imprison a lot of people who wind up in prison, and that the current prison system is incoherent.
I'm sure that someone will be able to offer a simple and correct explanation of what models the current justice system uses as justification for its policies.
I always thought that you needed to be competent at the time of the commission of the crime (to form appropriate intent), or sufficiently competent at the time of trial to assist in your own defense (fair trial). That's a guess, though.
I went and read the ruling. It’s a long comment, so if you’re not interested, fine. I don’t need your approval, anyway.
From the abstract:
Because of [mentally retarded individuals'] disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against mentally retarded defendents.
So, Justice Stevens has raised two concerns: A) the issue of culpability and B) the issue of the difficulty of a fair trial when the defendant is retarded.
Stevens then cites a dissenting opinion in a previous ruling: ”the imposition of the sentence of death upon a criminal defendant who has the mental age of a child between the ages of 9 and 12 is excessive..
This looks like a clarification of A. The opinion is that it is not the case that M Atkins is entirely unable to be held responsible, but that the extent to which he is held responsible is not sufficient to warrant capital punishment.
In section two, Stevens hints that the 8th amendment, against cruel and unusual punishment, might be construed to prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded.
Section 4, getting to the meat of this issue: there is abundant evidence that [the mentally retarded] often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.
Stevens then cites the two reasons given for capital punishment: “retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.” The execution of the offender must “measurably contribute to one or both of these goals.” Stevens argues that the reduced culpability of the mentally retarded renders retribution an insufficient reason for capital punishment.
With respect to deterrence, Stevens cites a previous ruling which states that .it seems likely that “capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation.” But, as mentioned, it does not seem that the mentally retarded premeditate wrongful actions. Stevens: Exempting the mentally retarded from that punishment will not affect the “cold calculus that precedes the decision” of other potential murderers...Such individuals are unprotected by the exemption and will continue to face the threat of execution. Thus, executing the mentally retarded will not measurably further the goal of deterrence.
…I’ll just note this seems like circular reasoning to me. (I think the whole idea of capital punishment as deterrence is bunk, anyway)
Stevens goes on the bring up again the issue of a fair trial, concluding, Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution.
So, on these reasons, should M Atkins stay of execution be rescinded? On the issue of retribution, certainly not. A more mentally competent M Atkins should not be held accountable for what he did in a previous, qualitatively different, state. Juvenile delinquents are released, not re-tried, at 18. The issue of deterrence is a little less clear, but I think Justice Stevens’s initial reasoning still stands. Further, if M Atkins were to be executed, it would serve as a deterrent to educating other mentally retarded prisoners. As someone who believes the only possible positive functions of prisons are education and ingraining discipline, I certainly wouldn’t want to see that happen.
I feel a bit like a law student now. It feels kind of…icky.
a) Why "oddly enough"? Unless your a hardcore nature determinist, the idea seems fairly mundane that increased mental practice would lead to increased mental ability.
b) This has some odd ramifications on the reason why we don't execute retarded people. I had assumed the reason was that retarded people were judged to not be responsible for their actions. If M Atkins is sentenced to death, it will mean that we simply do not execute retarded people because there is something wrong with the act of killing a retarded person as opposed to a person of normal intelligence. This is odd. Typically, the less intelligent the animal, the less moral justification required to OK its murder. Maybe, though, we're not so far from the supersitious belief the the mentally handicapped are touched by the gods.
Maybe Unf can clear things up. Or I suppose I could look up the ruling myself. Yeah, that might be faster...
Posted by Michael | Link to this comment | 02- 6-05 2:14 PM
I like the combination of an interesting issue and an Unf dig.
This issue has come up in cases where, say, an inmate has been mentally incapacitated as the result of a prison injury-- competent at the time of the crime, not at the time of punishment. I think the rationale is that the punishment can't be understood as punishment for past action, but this is totally off the top of my head. I've been meaning to look this up, though, since it's an important question.
Posted by FL | Link to this comment | 02- 6-05 2:22 PM
Unlike Labs, I haven't been meaning to look this up, but his memory accords with mine. In the Rickey Ray Rector case was not his responsibility at the time of the crime--his brain damage came from his shooting himself in the head after killing the policeman, IIRC--but his inability to understand the punishment. Apparently he saved some of his last meal for the next day.
I don't think "oddly enough" means here that it's odd that this would be the case, but that the whole situation is odd.
I also don't think that it makes me proud in our advanced society that we're talking about whether we get to execute a man because his IQ went from 59 to 76 after his trial. Life in prison should be good enough.
Posted by Matt Weiner | Link to this comment | 02- 6-05 2:32 PM
It depends on what theory of imprisonment/punishment is operative. I don't think it makes sense to execute someone who was mentally incompetent at the time of commission of the crime, or to execute someone who has become mentally incompetent following commission of the crime. But I also don't think it makes sense to imprison a lot of people who wind up in prison, and that the current prison system is incoherent.
I'm sure that someone will be able to offer a simple and correct explanation of what models the current justice system uses as justification for its policies.
Posted by ben wolfson | Link to this comment | 02- 6-05 4:23 PM
I always thought that you needed to be competent at the time of the commission of the crime (to form appropriate intent), or sufficiently competent at the time of trial to assist in your own defense (fair trial). That's a guess, though.
Posted by SomeCallMeTim | Link to this comment | 02- 6-05 4:34 PM
I went and read the ruling. It’s a long comment, so if you’re not interested, fine. I don’t need your approval, anyway.
From the abstract:
Because of [mentally retarded individuals'] disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against mentally retarded defendents.
So, Justice Stevens has raised two concerns: A) the issue of culpability and B) the issue of the difficulty of a fair trial when the defendant is retarded.
Stevens then cites a dissenting opinion in a previous ruling: ”the imposition of the sentence of death upon a criminal defendant who has the mental age of a child between the ages of 9 and 12 is excessive..
This looks like a clarification of A. The opinion is that it is not the case that M Atkins is entirely unable to be held responsible, but that the extent to which he is held responsible is not sufficient to warrant capital punishment.
In section two, Stevens hints that the 8th amendment, against cruel and unusual punishment, might be construed to prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded.
Section 4, getting to the meat of this issue: there is abundant evidence that [the mentally retarded] often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.
Stevens then cites the two reasons given for capital punishment: “retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.” The execution of the offender must “measurably contribute to one or both of these goals.” Stevens argues that the reduced culpability of the mentally retarded renders retribution an insufficient reason for capital punishment.
With respect to deterrence, Stevens cites a previous ruling which states that .it seems likely that “capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation.” But, as mentioned, it does not seem that the mentally retarded premeditate wrongful actions. Stevens: Exempting the mentally retarded from that punishment will not affect the “cold calculus that precedes the decision” of other potential murderers...Such individuals are unprotected by the exemption and will continue to face the threat of execution. Thus, executing the mentally retarded will not measurably further the goal of deterrence.
…I’ll just note this seems like circular reasoning to me. (I think the whole idea of capital punishment as deterrence is bunk, anyway)
Stevens goes on the bring up again the issue of a fair trial, concluding, Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution.
So, on these reasons, should M Atkins stay of execution be rescinded? On the issue of retribution, certainly not. A more mentally competent M Atkins should not be held accountable for what he did in a previous, qualitatively different, state. Juvenile delinquents are released, not re-tried, at 18. The issue of deterrence is a little less clear, but I think Justice Stevens’s initial reasoning still stands. Further, if M Atkins were to be executed, it would serve as a deterrent to educating other mentally retarded prisoners. As someone who believes the only possible positive functions of prisons are education and ingraining discipline, I certainly wouldn’t want to see that happen.
I feel a bit like a law student now. It feels kind of…icky.
Posted by Michael | Link to this comment | 02- 6-05 4:51 PM
Where does W. say to kick away the ladder?
Posted by rilkefan | Link to this comment | 02- 6-05 9:03 PM
At the end of the Tractatus.
Posted by ben wolfson | Link to this comment | 02- 6-05 9:08 PM
Tractatus 6.54. (I had no idea it was online. Cool!)
Posted by ogged | Link to this comment | 02- 6-05 9:09 PM
Er muß sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen.
Ok, "kick away the ladder" is an improvement, not a translation.
Thanks.
Actually that makes perfect sense to me.
Posted by rilkefan | Link to this comment | 02- 6-05 9:18 PM
A very Zen statement.
Posted by ben wolfson | Link to this comment | 02- 6-05 9:19 PM
No, what W. said was "'Please don't kill me.'"
Posted by Matt Weiner | Link to this comment | 02- 7-05 8:43 AM
Matt, that was beautiful.
Posted by FL | Link to this comment | 02- 7-05 9:35 AM
And I'd like to blow my own horn on the punctuation.
Posted by Matt Weiner | Link to this comment | 02- 7-05 9:38 AM
I'd like to blow my own horn
Take up yoga.
Posted by apostropher | Link to this comment | 02- 7-05 9:43 AM
But does he say anything about my staff on crack? No.
Posted by Matt Weiner | Link to this comment | 02- 7-05 12:00 PM