But seriously, I doubt any such argument would convince me. If knowing-how were reducible to knowing-that, there would be no need whatever for science.
I'm pretty sure what he's looking for is something like, "I know how to knit" or to follow your example, "I know how to build and maintain an engine" is reducible to "I know that the pistons have to be connected in this way, and the cam shafts hooked up in this way, etc."
What you're looking for is probably Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson's paper "Knowing How", Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 411-44. Several shorter discussion pieces have since appeared in J. Phil.
I still don't get the distinction, so I'm sure I won't be of any help. The only thing I was thinking of was Aristotle's distinction between the knowledge of the foreman and that of the worker, but I don't think that's going to apply here.
Michael, knowing how: to drive a car--knowing that: the gas pedal is connected to a wire, which activates a valve, which inject gasoline into a cylinder where it ignites, increasing the pressure...etc.
Consider the game of hex (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hex_(board_game)), a simple two player game. It is easy to prove that the first player has a winning strategy. But the proof is indirect; it argues that one player must have a winning strategy and that it can't be player 2. The proof doesn't come close to telling player 1 what moves to make in order to win. It doesn't offer any clue.
So if I'm player 1, I know that I can win, but I have no godly idea how to win.
As other people have noted, the Stanely and Williamson article is the basis of the most recent generation of discussion of this topic. Rumfit's reply in J. Phil. 2003 should be read afterwards.
Somewhere out there, someone has created an algorithm for robotic 'balance.' As such, it appears as though you can teach a robot to ride a bicycle. I've made a far-short of earnest effort to google the article that I read, alas to no avail.
Since we don't have access to the mental states of a person that might constitute knowing-how or knowing-that, we must rely on observed behavior to characterize both. I would argue that the behaviors we generally construe as knowing-how, and those we generally construe as knowing-that, do not coincide very well. In particular, neither is a strict inclusion of the other. We could conclude that, at least extensionally, there is no reducibility from one to the other.
I would say that the robot in 15 (should it exist) knows-how to ride a bicycle, but you would have to ask it whether it knew-that that was what it was doing. Probably not. But we knew already that knowing-that is not reducible to knowing-how. Right?
It's analogous to the argument that kung-pao is reducible to kung-fu.
Posted by Standpipe Bridgeplate | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 11:41 AM
Do you mean,
I know how an engine works
is somehow reducible to
I know that an engine works
?
Posted by Michael | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 11:52 AM
But seriously, I doubt any such argument would convince me. If knowing-how were reducible to knowing-that, there would be no need whatever for science.
Posted by Standpipe Bridgeplate | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 11:56 AM
Michael-
I'm pretty sure what he's looking for is something like, "I know how to knit" or to follow your example, "I know how to build and maintain an engine" is reducible to "I know that the pistons have to be connected in this way, and the cam shafts hooked up in this way, etc."
Posted by washerdreyer | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 11:59 AM
As any Googler might lazily tell you in an effort to help, there are lots of references in:
http://www.ex.ac.uk/sell/subjects/art/documents/other_course_documents/problematic_relationship.rtf
Posted by rob | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 12:00 PM
Also, I don't have my Plato lying around, but I vaguely remember an interesting take on this from my Ancient Phil. class.
Posted by washerdreyer | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 12:05 PM
What you're looking for is probably Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson's paper "Knowing How", Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 411-44. Several shorter discussion pieces have since appeared in J. Phil.
Posted by pekka | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 12:16 PM
A colleague of mine has a nifty reply to S&W in J.Phil. 99 (June 2002), 325-328.
Posted by Ted H. | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 12:27 PM
I take back #3. I was in thrall to a dogma of empiricism at the time, but I got better.
Posted by Standpipe Bridgeplate | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 12:30 PM
I still don't get the distinction, so I'm sure I won't be of any help. The only thing I was thinking of was Aristotle's distinction between the knowledge of the foreman and that of the worker, but I don't think that's going to apply here.
Posted by Michael | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 1:24 PM
Michael, knowing how: to drive a car--knowing that: the gas pedal is connected to a wire, which activates a valve, which inject gasoline into a cylinder where it ignites, increasing the pressure...etc.
Posted by ogged | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 1:47 PM
Consider the game of hex (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hex_(board_game)), a simple two player game. It is easy to prove that the first player has a winning strategy. But the proof is indirect; it argues that one player must have a winning strategy and that it can't be player 2. The proof doesn't come close to telling player 1 what moves to make in order to win. It doesn't offer any clue.
So if I'm player 1, I know that I can win, but I have no godly idea how to win.
Posted by joe | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 2:06 PM
As other people have noted, the Stanely and Williamson article is the basis of the most recent generation of discussion of this topic. Rumfit's reply in J. Phil. 2003 should be read afterwards.
Posted by bza | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 2:12 PM
Thanks, Pekka; that's the one.
Posted by FL | Link to this comment | 05- 3-05 2:47 PM
Somewhere out there, someone has created an algorithm for robotic 'balance.' As such, it appears as though you can teach a robot to ride a bicycle. I've made a far-short of earnest effort to google the article that I read, alas to no avail.
Posted by kitty darfour | Link to this comment | 05-10-05 3:57 AM
Apologies for the armchair philosophy:
Since we don't have access to the mental states of a person that might constitute knowing-how or knowing-that, we must rely on observed behavior to characterize both. I would argue that the behaviors we generally construe as knowing-how, and those we generally construe as knowing-that, do not coincide very well. In particular, neither is a strict inclusion of the other. We could conclude that, at least extensionally, there is no reducibility from one to the other.
I would say that the robot in 15 (should it exist) knows-how to ride a bicycle, but you would have to ask it whether it knew-that that was what it was doing. Probably not. But we knew already that knowing-that is not reducible to knowing-how. Right?
Posted by Standpipe Bridgeplate | Link to this comment | 05-10-05 8:26 AM
mental states of a person
To all the rabbits and robots among you, I apologize for the gratuitous speciesism (resp. mechanismism).
Posted by Standpipe Bridgeplate | Link to this comment | 05-10-05 8:28 AM