I didn't know they changed their name from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.
The G-2 being China and Russia these days, presumably.
I agreed with most of it until he started arguing that Red Dawn is going to seem like a documentary after 2030.
Anyway, what's happening in Asia seems to me like just part of the general collapse of the post-WWII order that followed the collapse of the ability of the United States to govern itself. I have no idea how it will end, but I suspect that either Asia's inter-governmental institutions will get better or there will be a big war.
I'm hopeful that there won't be a big war because Asia is big and so to have a war between two Asian powers you'd need at least one of them to have significant power projection ability, and pretty much none of them do. Even if Japan gets really angry with Indonesia, it physically can't put a division on shore in Java. China would have an incredibly hard time taking Taiwan even if the US didn't get involved. Even Russia - Ukraine was just the easiest possible invasion for them to do (nice and flat, they knew the ground, no foreign intervention, land borders with rail routes right into the target country) and they still couldn't manage it.
I'm very good at skimming for the main point.
Russia had to do it while pretending it was local oafs doing it. That makes it harder.
Hope, as they say, is not a plan.
8 is broadly right, but it's right for now, and "now" is just a year after the end of American credibility. Also, not all Asian borders are maritime, though you're right that they seem to hold the most likely trouble spots.
Plus, Japan's lack of force-projection capacity is basically because American didn't want them to have force-projection capacity. I know it is hard to build a modern naval force starting from scratch, but historically Japan has done that better than anybody.
12: true, Asia has land borders. (the obvious one, and very much an exception to my statement: Korea. Also, of course, India/Pakistan.)
But for a major war you'd need to have some reasonable-sized countries on at least one side. And you can't (obviously) have a war involving Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Taiwan or Indonesia without someone doing some maritime power projection.
And even their land power projection ability is limited. A lot of the others are either horrific jungle or mountains or both. Apart from India/Pakistan, all India's land borders are pretty much militarily impassable.
And, Japanese rearmament (which it can hardly responsibly avoid) will necessarily inflame tensions with at least China.
Apart from India/Pakistan, all India's land borders are pretty much militarily impassable.
That would probably be news to various Vietnamese people who have fought against China.
14: All true (though I note also that lots of people got killed on the horrifically mountainous China-Vietnam border not so long ago). There's also the possibility of ground and/or substate wars drawing in other powers without any conventional naval warfare.
I bet they all had tremendous calves.
And force projection isn't what it used to be. The Chinese evidently intend to use conventional ballistic missiles to do what the Americans do with aircraft and cruise missiles, for instance. Outfitting lots of smaller ships with missiles and drones will also be a hell of a lot easier than mastering carrier aviation and nuclear submarines.
The movie where the guys who launch the ballistic missiles go to training on how to push buttons and then remove their shirts to play sand volleyball is going to suck.
And force projection isn't what it used to be. The Chinese evidently intend to use conventional ballistic missiles to do what the Americans do with aircraft and cruise missiles, for instance.
Not really, no. Because
a) the Chinese are actually also putting a lot of effort into building aircraft carriers, and indeed cruise missiles (ground and air launched)
b) the whole "carrier killer" ASBM concept is untested, highly dubious, and generally promoted by people who have their own reasons for being anti aircraft carriers and/or anti the US defence establishment
c) you cannot project power with ballistic missiles alone, any more than you can with airstrikes alone
d) not least because there's no way of telling what they've got in the way of payload before it's too late, and chucking a lot of them around is going to make people worry about one or more of them carrying a bucket of instant sunshine
bucket of instant sunshine
This may win 'most viscerally disturbing euphemism ever'. I'll be twitching nervously for a while now.
That's another thing to worry about regardless of the type of missiles used. Before we won the Cold War with barely-plausibly-deniable homoeroticism, being on the other side of the globe meant more time for decision makers to react to incoming vectors. Intra-Asian conflict will not have those extra minutes.
Outfitting lots of smaller ships with missiles and drones will also be a hell of a lot easier than mastering carrier aviation and nuclear submarines.
Drones aren't immune to the laws of aerodynamics. The utility of a drone will depend on things like range (= size of fuel tanks, hence = size of airframe), weapons load (= size of airframe) and sensor load (= size of airframe and also = available electric power, which = size of airframe). So a useful combat drone is going to be big. Aircraft sized. And complex and expensive, so you'll want to get it back. And that means that a ship that carries them is going to be big. And we know what a ship that is designed to carry and fly off things the size of aircraft is; it's an aircraft carrier.
The same also applies to the "missile boat" concept that people like the War Nerd are so fond of. Sea distances in the Western Pacific are big, and it can get choppy from time to time. So you need a ship with range and seakeeping ability - in other words, size. And all the same applies with regard to sensor and weapon load.
22: No argument on any points. I don't deny that higher-end capabilities are still valuable, I'm saying the costs of entry may be lower.
This may win 'most viscerally disturbing euphemism ever'
Googling it reveals a hilarious divide between people who know what it means and people who just think of it as a delightful phrase.
I hadn't seen it before and it took me a minute, which is probably why it was unsettling.
It's not really a euphemism if using it is more disturbing than just saying "nuclear warhead", is it? Dysphemism?
There's also the China-Russia border. They're roughly allied for now, but they're increasingly nasty nationalist autocracies. There's no guarantee they'll stay that way. Both nuclear powers, yes, but they were in 1969 too.
That is a real concern, but I got the feeling that the OP article was talking about Asia-Pacific specifically - there's never really been a unipolar moment of US dominance with regard to China/Russia.
31: Sure. It's hard to draw lines though. You spoke about India-Pakistan earlier, which obviously is Asia, but not in my mind Asia-Pacific. On the other side, Russia isn't a Pacific power by any stretch, but it is there. If Japan rearms that will piss off China; but Japan has outstanding disputes with Russia too.
On the other side, Russia isn't a Pacific power by any stretch, but it is there.
Well, that could change. It has a Pacific Fleet, which hasn't many surface combatants but a lot of submarines, including more nuclear boats than there are in the navies of every other Asian nation put together. And a lot of naval aviation - which, of course, is much more easily reinforced from Western Russia than the ships are.
hey ajay, what do you think of this:
??? plausible nightmare fuel, or do i just fall back on various child- and work-related angst? my insomnia and night terrors want to know! thanks in advance!
I don't under how any nightmare of nuclear war can be implausible when Trump is sitting by the button.
34: I'm not a subscriber and so can remain blissfully unaware.
34 seems plausible. I'd hope the ICBMs would be less reliable still.
"Unreliable ICBMs" seems like a sub-optimal solution.
The G-2 being China and Russia these days, presumably.
In case anyone else is curious, here's what the linked article means by "G-2".
For decades, Asia analysts have pondered the prospects of a "G-2 condominium"--a type of order whereby the rules of the region are set by its great powers, the United States and China. A G-2 order would rest on an implicit grand bargain between China and the United States wherein each agrees to respect some to-be-determined strategic interests of the other. Recurring objects of exchange in such a bargain include Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, China's territorial dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and ballistic missile defense, among others. China has long sought a G-2 with the United States, which it prefers to describe as a "New Type of Great Power Relations" (NTGPR). Although a contentious concept, some scholars have seemingly endorsed it in the past.
For China, a G-2 order would simplify how dispute resolution occurs, and reduce the number of relevant voices in the region to only the United States. Most importantly, a G-2 requires US recognition--whether implicit or formal--of a Chinese sphere of influence, and that the two are co-equals. The Trump administration has at times indulged in the construction of a G-2 form of order-building. When US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited Beijing in March 2017, he came out of his meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi with a statement that aligned closely with how China expresses NTGPR: "non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win solutions." Trump, moreover, has proven willing to stay silent about claims of Chinese currency manipulation and on Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, as long as China can manage the North Korean threat on behalf of the United States.
21: Thanks for the link; that's an interesting paper.
And on the OP--you're right, the original paper isn't too long... and is worrisome.
39: Or, as I have taken to calling this administration's foreign policy approach, The Project for a Post-American Century.
I think the article underestimates the Trump admin's/Trump's willingness to accommodate China. This is a "through a tweet darkly" assessment, but Trump has been particular to emphasize how North Korea has done this or that awful thing despite China's best efforts. It's struck me as protesting too much, like he's trying to convince himself. We're not seeing S. China Sea patrols, we're not seeing any engagement with Vietnam or Thailand, we're shitting on South Korea.
Take this with a grain of salt because it's based on tone rather than actual evidence. But my impression is that there is some sort of understanding that Trump is trying to convince himself he got the best of.
Oh, and I've decided that TPP was primarily, from the USG's perspective, a strategic initiative. The Chinese version, so far much more successful, is One Belt One Road.
Of course TPP was a strategic initiative.
44: I think the Trump admin is neither willing nor unwilling to accommodate China: it simply doesn't have a foreign policy. When Tillerson came out of the Xi meeting parroting Chinese euphemisms it caused panic in the region, because the region knows that China attaches vast importance to appearances, and if America talks China's language that looks as if China won. But I don't think for a second Tillerson actually agreed anything with China: he parroted their language because he doesn't know any better and has no staff.
46: Here's Obama, Nov 2011 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament
we're working with Australia and our other APEC partners to create a seamless regional economy. And with Australia and other partners, we're on track to achieve our most ambitious trade agreement yet, and a potential model for the entire region -- the Trans-Pacific Partnership.Right after essentially announcing the Asia pivot. It was all of a piece.
The Project for a Post-American Century.
Like it.
50: Thanks! Feel free to propagate.
Sort of on topic because Asia: LinkedIn is suggesting that I want to follow the Crown Prince of Dubai. I assume this is a (very, very minor) part of the Gulf publicity war/blockade/etc.
OK, I've now managed to read the link in 34. The bit which doesn't make sense is this:
"The [North Korean] crew fired a surface-to-air missile, sending the [South Korean airliner] plunging into the ocean, killing all 250 people on board. The South Korean public was outraged. Within hours, Moon ordered South Korean missile units to strike the air defense battery, as well as select leadership targets throughout North Korea..."
For various reasons.
First, the South Korean public has a tendency to be pretty forgiving of North Korea deliberately killing South Koreans. (Certainly compared to the anger that results from Americans killing South Koreans by accident.) The sinking of the Cheonan killed 104 South Koreans and there was no massive public outrage, no protest marches, no cries for revenge. In fact only a third of the South Korean public was even prepared to believe that North Korea was to blame; this rose to 70% after the ROK Going by the Cheonan incident, we should instead expect to see public reactions like:
"The airliner was shot down by the Americans in order to provoke a war"
"It was an accident, no one is to blame"
"It's our fault for provoking the North with these exercises"
Second, it is highly unlikely that President Moon (that any ROK president, really, but especially Moon) would respond with a military strike and even more unlikely that he would do so "within hours", without any communication with Pyongyang, and without consulting the US. And even more unlikely still that he would escalate by striking not only the battery responsible but also "leadership targets". That is not a limited strike, as the article claims; that is essentially a unilateral declaration of general war by the ROK against North Korea.
So this scenario is really "Moon goes nuts and decides to commit suicide". And we don't accept that kind of scenario when it's "Kim Jong-un goes nuts and decides to commit suicide". Why accept this one?
Sorry, dropped a bit of sentence. " this rose to 70% after the ROK government investigation blamed the North".
Also an error: 102 killed or wounded aboard Cheonan. (46 killed, 56 wounded.) Not 104 killed.