Julie Delpy, the embodiment of all human virtues.
As I remember from the Protagoras, Socrates counfounds Progagoras when P tries to say that virtues are distinct from each other. Socrates position seems to be that the virtues intermingle (e.g., as the example given, courage seems to require wisdom). If my memory is right, then it seems odd to call that position a unity.
Hrm, well, I suppose that in the Republic that Justice could be the unitary virtue.
Yeah, but it never ended up being defined there.
I had in mind the general thesis that the virtues (in some sense) stand or fall together. Some virtue ethicists buy into this, but it's always struck me as really implausible.
It doesn't struck me as prima facie implausible, although it may just be wrong.
Many of the virtues are interdependent (generosity and compassion) and all of them seem to require the virtue of prudence (otherwise how can you discern whether it is right to be courageous or foolhardy?) I'd be willing to believe that groups of related virtues (some excellences requires others) stand or fall together, but unity? Does courage require compassion?
Not as sure.
It makes some sense to me - take courage: what we might call the character trait involved in acting courageously sometimes will lead one to virtuous action and sometimes not. So there's a simple and immediate distinction to be made between courage (the trait) and vcourage (the trait, except virtuously - namely in the situations where and to the extent to which it is virtuous).
Having courage isn't necessarily bad, of course, but it's better to have vcourage. Of course, having vcourage entails having vpracticalwisdom, if only because that's needed to have vcourage at all (it doesn't count as vcourage if you just accidentally always get it right). And having vpracticalwisdom comes along with a whole host of the other virtues too, if only because having vpracticalwisdom involves knowing what the virtuous action would be in some case and being able to perform it (roughly - I think there are steps here that would need to be filled out).
Dr P,
That works in Plato because he has a unitary idea of good. But do you think it works if one doesn't accept Plato's metaphysics?
As I recall, if virtue is defined (as it often is by Socrates) as knowledge of good and evil, then unity of the virtues follows. Certain medievals (digging deep here) explained the seeming diversity of the virtues (courage not the same as temperance, e.g.) with the notion that the vices were different, amounting to falling away from virtue in different circumstances. (cowardice = lack of knowledge of the good w.r.t. occassions of phyical danger, intemperance = lack of knowledge of the good w.r.t. pleasures, etc.)
My fear is that defining "virtue" begs the question--it already assumes that "virtue" is a unity. One might say that a virtue is knowledge of one kind of goodness or rightness--courage is the knowledge of the right way to face danger, justice is the knowledge of giving to all what is theirs, like that--and then it wouldn't be obvious that having one of these entails the others.
I guess this is just Michael's point again--if you accept that Teh Good is a unity, then virtue as knowledge of Teh Good will be a unity. But if you think that it is possible to know what is good in one area without knowing what is good in another area, then the definition of virtue as knowledge of good and evil doesn't seem to entail the unity of virtues.
I agree that if UotV is defined as the Vlastos biconditional (to have one is to have them all) then UotV is likely wrong. Or most of what we perceive as virtues (like courage and temperance) in fact aren't. Because we know there are courageous, intemperate people.
Again, just dredging up my memories of the Laches, what Socrates is doing most of the time with UotV is confuting people who have obviously wrong ideas of what virtue is.
Well (and I'm really very far out of my depth on Plato and secondary literature) we could say that an intemperate person can't be truly courageous--courage requires judgment of when courage is appropriate (else it's rashness), and if you are intemperate you will lack judgment in situations of temperance, some of which will be relevant to courage--I'm waving my hands a bit here. This is perhaps more of an Aristotelian view--does Plato say the same sort of thing about how virtues require judgments?--but I'm vaguely under the impression that Aristotle is also committed to unity of the virtues, though he could be wrong about that.
I do agree with what I think is your point in 11, which is that the arguments for UotV will only go through on a conception of the virtues that is very far from that of most modern virtue ethicists (AFAIK).
what Socrates is doing most of the time with UotV is confuting people who have obviously wrong ideas of what virtue is.
Good evidence for this would be that one of the definitions of courage which Socrates supposedly refutes in the Laches seems to be the same as the definition of courage which is offered up in the Republic. Of course, making this critique is effectively calling Socrates a sophist, and I should watch my back.
I'm vaguely under the impression that Aristotle is also committed to unity of the virtues
I don't think so. Aristotle seems more down with empirical observations like baa's - that virtues and vices can mix and match in people.
I guess what I'm thinking of is Aristotle's claim (I think) that all the virtues require phronimos (practical wisdom). Can you have phronimos and lack one of the virtues? But I may be getting this from the pastry case.
"At age ten the madam put the child in a cage with a bear trained to couple with young girls so the girls would be frigid and not fall in love with their patrons. They fed her through the bars and aroused the bear with a stick when it seemed to lose interest."
Aristotle is indeed committed to some sort of unity thesis with respect to full (as opposed to natural) virtue. Also, I sprinkled poop on Weiner's thesis.
I have yet to contribute a non-pedantic comment to this blog, but re 14: phronimos isn't practical wisdom, it's the person who has practical wisdom. Wisdom itself is phronesis.
I think the one where you revealed my grad school nickname was non-pedantic, you bastard. But yes, that's right--oops.