Eventually, everybody's just going to have to suck it up and admit that the Iraqi civil war started some time ago.
What's mildly terrifying to me is that I don't have the least idea about what the next course of action should be. Once upon a time, pulling out seemed like a good idea. But now, a true failed state seems like a real possibility. And having one of those in that neighborhood seems like a plan for a bigger disaster. Ugh.
a true failed state seems like a real possibility
A possibility? What criterion of a failed state isn't already in existence?
Sure, nothing good (for Iraq) is going to come from pulling out. But nothing good is going to come from staying either. The only good course of action was never to have invaded in the first place. This was never going to be anything but punching a tarbaby.
Setting off a civil war and hightailing it out of there is morally bankrupt, indeed. Unfortunately, there is no way to unshit the bed at this point. No turning point is coming that would make a withdrawal a clean affair. But we ought to do it now, before we reach the point of having to fight our way out.
What worries me is the nagging thought that we might be setting off (have set off) a regional war, rather than a civil war.
You can count on it, JM. No way does this stay neatly with the borders.
It's maddening not knowing what's really happening in Iraq, and having no solid way of judging between contradictory reports.
Your best bet is to assume that whatever Bush, Cheney or Rumsfeld says is wrong, to look suspiciously at anything that comes from any official source, and to trust stuff from reporters on the ground unless you have some reason not to.
I just don't think it's that hard to figure out pretty much what's happen.
Okay, but this is where we get back into the question of whether we can afford to leave. If the regional consequences of an Iraqi civil war are as bad as I fear, then the US (and perhaps a lot of other countries) might have to go right back in.
might have to go right back in
Why?
#4 is exactly what worries me most, too. It sucks to say it but it's one think to have Africa be Africa, and it's another to have the Middle East be Africa. Cripes - there are a fair number of Lebanese people who think that, at least initially, Syria coming in was a good thing.
Why?
I can think of a number of really bad things that could happen that would trigger an interventionist response: A whole bunch of oil going off-line, massive religious/ethnic cleansing, Israel about to use their nukes...
We've all had worst-case fugues. Maybe there's little that can be done at any of these hypothetical future points.
All of those things would be bad, yes (though I don't see any plausible scenario that would make Israel drop the bomb). But why do any of them necessitate an American intervention?
there are a fair number of Lebanese people who think that, at least initially, Syria coming in was a good thing
And there would be a fair number of Iraqis that would consider Iran coming in a good thing. Again, I don't see how that makes it essential for the US to intervene. Regional wars have happened in the Middle East before, they will happen again. It is not incumbent upon us to be involved in them.
A lot of the prior regional wars fit within the structure of the Cold War - the awful outcomes were somewhat limited by the major powers. I'm less sure that would happen today. Also, as JM implied or said - this is valuable real estate, and things get much crazier when valuable real estate gets involved. Massive oil disruptions strike me as really, really bad - I'm not sure what people in the US would think was appropriate in the face of stagflation and the like, but I'm not sanguine.
Part of it is that I think that really bad things usually grow from very small things, and usually because we aren't willing to pay the various costs until it becomes a really bad thing.
A few lines of argument in that direction, although I'm ambivalent and heartsick of the whole damn thing:
--regional actors are much more likely to commit ethnic cleansing and border-redrawing of the sort that I thought the international community was supposed to prevent.
--international actors with decent-sized armies and resources aren't going to contribute to an international effort unless the US contributes substantially. And eats a whole buncha humble pie. (This is the best-case version of "going back in.")
--the above international actors interfering with the Middle East outside of an international framework could very well set off a bigger war. Oh, I'm not even going to speculate about that one any more.
I don't see any plausible scenario that would make Israel drop the bomb
I concur, but I can envision Israel pre-emptively attacking "suspected" nuclear sites in Iran. They would likely have to use Iraqi airspace, which means US-controlled airspace. So it'd be messy. But I categorize such a scenario as "well within the realm of possibility," especially if the international response to Iran continues to be, [Eddie Izzard voice] "What's that you say? Something about a reactor? Oh, that's very funny. Do go on."
They would likely have to use Iraqi airspace, which means US-controlled airspace.
Not under the envisioned scenario here, which is a conflict following a US withdrawal.
I doubt the US will actually withdraw. Would someone like to convince me that (a) the US will withdraw within the next year or two and/or that (b) this withdrawal is a good idea?
The only nearly good scenario going forward involves a supranational occupying force—i.e., a real coalition. Forming one would require that the EU or the UN or—perhaps more likely—some combination of countries not the US and UK—develop intestinal fortitude.
But I think the best chance for changing the conditions of the occupation passed when Kerry lost; a Kerry win would have made possible a fresh diplomatic start. Now I see nothing on the cards but malign neglect.
Stanley, I don't think that withdrawal is a good idea. I do, however, believe it is now the least bad idea. I also believe the chances of the EU or the UN putting troops into Iraq are somewhere between slim and none. They would receive the same treatment as the US forces.
Iraq is in a civil war now. That war will only accelerate and deepen in the foreseeable future. How long are we supposed to stay? Indefinitely? We're currently spending ~6 billion dollars a month on it and stretching our military to the point of breaking.
17: (a) No. I don't think we will. (b) The argument as I understand it is that we aren't doing any good by remaining -- levels of violence are high, sectarian tensions are increasing rather than resolving, and so although nothing good will happen because we've left, nothing good will happen because we stay. Given that, why are we staying?
Given that, why are we staying?
The cynical (and probably correct) answer: permanent military bases that we can use to launch strikes at surrounding countries.
Apo, you're a flaming Pollyanna. The only reason we're staying is so that we won't be seen to be leaving.
I suspect the other half is that this administration, being made up heavily of veterans of the energy business, know full well that peak oil is near and intend to control Iraq's reserves come hell or high water. So we're not withdrawing before 2008 at the earliest.
The only reason we're staying is so that we won't be seen to be leaving.
I wish it was that simple, slol, but if that was all it was, Bush wouldn't have invaded in the first place.
I know we broke the china shop here, but how about getting some of those rich, corrupt, Middle Eastern theocracy countries to pony up. I'm sure they have money and guns. Fuck, we'll even let 'em run the ports in Iraq if they're really nice...
Seriously though, I know that the UN has often cajoled surrounding countries to contribute in Africa, and in Haiti right now (like that Brazilian dude that killed himself -- that worked out great!)
if that was all it was, Bush wouldn't have invaded in the first place.
I have moods in which I suspect that the motivation for the invasion was largely pure domestic politics -- preserving and intensifying the perceived 9-11 emergency for electoral advantage -- and that any geopolitical effects were gravy. It seems to explain the facts as well as anything else.
I think you're awfully optimistic if you think there's a strategically plausible reason for our remaining there or behind the invasion in the first instance. I don't believe it for a minute. I think there are clever people—Niall Ferguson, say—who would like there to have been good sensible immoral realpolitik reasons for the invasion and who list the bases as one. But I don't think those people are in charge. The guy who is in charge apparently really thinks this is a crusade for good™, and what we know about good™ is it always triumphs, so long as we persevere and pray.
I don't think there was any one reason. I think there were many, many reasons that made it appealing -- oil, politics, establishing a presence in the Middle East, strengthening Israeli security, knocking some Arabs around to prove We Mean Business, etc. But domestic politics were definitely in the stew.
I think it's a mistake to assume that there is a unified set of reasons justifying the decision to go to war in Iraq. Lots of people supported it for lots of different reasons. "Coherent" is not a word I'd choose to use to describe our Iraq policy.
Given that no one group had a majority rationale for the war, it's not that surprising to realize that we can't figure out what either victory or failure looks like.
In fairness to the administration, Tim, I think they have made it possible for us to know what failure looks like.
You mean what you get when you google miserable failure?
(Cheap, but still funny.)
a strategically plausible reason for our remaining there
Oh, I don't think it's sound, realistic strategy. It's horribly misbegotten and unsustainable strategy. But they've proven time and again to be poor strategists in anything beyond political campaigns. The fact that it doesn't make logical sense hasn't ever stopped them from pursuing anything.
The guy who is in charge apparently really thinks this is a crusade for good™
See, that I don't believe for a second. He sells it that way, but his entire life points toward being an amoral calculator. I don't buy his religiosity at all. He has the same moral vision as Karl Rove. None.
I would be happyish with a president who was an amoral calculator, if I thought he could do his sums right.
32-4: I disagree. I would advance an argument for a foreign policy based very much in morality---but a very different morality from the current Administration's.
The IDHR is a good place to start. That's very much a moral statement, and one that could serve as a sound basis for a just foreign policy. (Of course, it hasn't yet {cf. Carter Administration}.)
I may be able to trump you all: I don't think there was a reason for going into Iraq, and I don't think there's a reason for staying. What happened was that someone, or more likely a bunch of people, convinced Bush that invading Iraq was something he wanted to do. And once he decided that, he was going to do it; and he's going to keep on doing it his way, because that's what he does. He doesn't act for reasons. That might require sometimes deciding not to do something you don't want, and if there's one thing we know about Bush it's that he hates doing stuff he doesn't want.
He's certainly willing to rearrange the facts in his head so that he doesn't have to do stuff he doesn't want: global warming, anyone?
How did he get convinced to do this? A bunch of his advisors were obsessed with Iraq for a while; Wolfowitz for the neocon reasons (and I think because Chalabi really convinced him that he could take over and recognize Israel), Rumsfeld god knows why; and Rove sure didn't mind the domestic political calculating. But I think what's driving policy now is that Bush doesn't like doing things he doesn't like doing.
I fear Matt Weiner may be right.
I'd like a philosopher of language to explain the difference in meaning between the two uses of "doesn't like doing" in the last sentence of 36.
Yes, 36 is right. There isn't a reason we invaded; there were many different reasons, held by many different people, who all coalesced around invasion as the way to achieve all of their disparate interests. Some of them (like Wolfowitz) probably really believed they were acting on a humanitarian imperative.
Well! guess you've come to the right place...
There's no literal difference in meaning; it's literally a tautology uttered to implicate something else. cf. "Boys will be boys."
Isn't philosophy of language your speciality, Matt?
But I take the two instances of "boys" in that latter expression to differ. The first instance of "boys" refers to the set of actual boys; the second instance of "boys" refers to the set of beings who possess boyish behaviors. So it's a statement about the attributability of gendered behaviors on the basis of sex.
Note: I tried to format this using subscripts and it didn't work. What kind of comment facility is this?
I think that literally they have the same meaning, but whatevs. I'm more an epistemologist than a philosopher of language, anyway.
So: the first "doesn't like doing" means absolutely hates to do, and will not do under almost any circumstances. The second means more or less what it usually means.
Dude! Can you use "whatevs" in peer-reviewed publications in your field? I am so switching specialties.
Um, this isn't a peer-reviewed publication, unless you're that Chuck Simmins guy who talked about how Instapundit was reviewed by peers LIKE MYSELF.
I was kidding. Also, "pwning" bears some resemblance to peer-review, I'll grant.
He just wanted the opportunity to blast you with caps lock, slol.
I was going to say that that was me channeling Simmins, but I don't even want to contemplate what Simmins blasting slol with CAPS LOCK, channelled by me, would amount to at the Mineshaft.
(a) the US will withdraw within the next year or two and/or that (b) this withdrawal is a good idea
I remain unconvinced of (a) or (b), and I suspect that some people here hold these views with some decent arguments backing them. Fire away, unless we're tired of talking about this li'l ol' Iraq thang.
I can't help you with (a) -- I don't think we'll get out of Iraq during the Bush administration, but from what you say, you're unconvinced by apo's 19 and my 20, both roughly saying that while the situation will be bad if we leave, it won't be any better if we stay. I might do better comming up with a somewhat more convincing version if I knew what about that proposition you found unconvincing.
I don't think anybody has voiced support for (a), and the operative question is not whether (b) is a good idea, but if it's going to lead to a better outcome than staying.
Stanley, I guess the question I would put to you is what conditions do you think should exist before withdrawal becomes a good idea? That might get us further down the path to a useful discussion.
Re. permanent military bases: I'd be more convinced by this if we didn't essentially already have them in Saudi Arabia. Apo, do you think that there's some fear/theory in the Bush administration that the Saudi bases aren't sustainable long-term? B/c of the Al Queda Holy Land thing, or what?
I'm your peer, Matt, and I'm reviewing your comments. Let's grant each other tenure! At the Mineshaft! There's a heavy load, but you'll enjoy our generosity with release time.
We have pretty much evacuated the Saudi bases, B. They were a big internal problem for the Saudis, opening them up to charges from the rest of the Muslim world that the Saudis were our lackeys. They wanted us out and, IIRC, wouldn't let us use them for air strikes on Iraq in 2003.
The info I can find says all US troops were removed from Saudi Arabia as of 10/03.
I don't think that's actually true, but I could be wrong. I do have an internal line, however, on when they were occupied, and it ain't what we were told.
I do know they were/are an internal problem, though. That's interesting about the air strikes, I'd forgotten that.
Three words: Cut and run. It's the only honorable thing to do.
They didn't let us use them for air strikes against Afghanistan in 2001, either. So they weren't quite as useful for attacking other countries as ones in a puppet-regime Iraq would be. Of course, the puppet part has proven more problematic than they expected, too.
I'm not quite as far along as McManus, but I think everything is going according to plan. Bush said all those things about the War on Terror lasting for decades. Sure that was played as rhetorical while impressions of easy playstation war were emphasized, but I think that they actually want a region-wide war to redraw all the borders and sell lots of airplanes. Permanent bases are important for keeping up some visibility there, even if we do stand down as the Turks and Iranians stand up. Maybe Bush is just being set up to "fail" Phase I. The Repubs will have to repudiate some of his policies just to feign credibility, but I'm sure Jeb can make that into a nice tough-talking-truth-hurts moment.
Where are the bases, anyway? Near the oil in the South and North?
Saudi bases aside, the United States maintains an extremely large and permanent base in Qatar, runs naval operations out of Bahrain, and I believe has a fairly permanent presence in Kuwait and other locations as well. Add Incirlik, and various other bases in the surrounding region, and I don't think permanent bases in Iraq add much to the strategic picture.
The main reason for our continued presence is stability inside Iraq, which affects the power-dynamic in the Middle East generally. However bad sectarian strife is there today, it would be far, far worse if the US were to leave, and intrigues by competitors in the Middle East, especially Syria and Iran, would dramatically increase.
The best argument for leaving is that i) at some point X in the near future Iraq will reach a level of instability equal to that which would exist if the US departed today, ii) the costs of maintaining such a large presence in Iraq are not outweighed by the benefits of maintaining stability prior to point X, and iii) there are no ancillary or systemic benefits to maintaining such a large presence in Iraq that justify the cost of that presence.
The crux of the issue is this: can the Iraqi state develop sufficient power and institutional loyalty to stand against and eventually destroy its competitors? If it can, and US assistance is necessary to that end (as it undoubtedly would be), then point X will not be reached, and the benefits of staying far outweigh the costs. If it can't, then point X is certain to be reached, and we should consider finding a face-saving excuse to leave.
Andrew, that's well-laid out, but I think it essentially rehearses the assumptions made in the foregoing comments, i.e., we all already think that point X is nigh.
I don't think permanent bases in Iraq add much to the strategic picture.
And yet, we're building them, so...
what conditions do you think should exist before withdrawal becomes a good idea?
(i) Stong, well-trained security forces (national and local) who can respond swiftly and decisely by themselves. (As I understand it, we currently hold there hands quite a bit, especially in the outlying parts of Bagdhad, per NPR story I'm too lazy to look up.)
I don't fully understand the hurdles involved in training/recruiting. But it's taking longer than I expected, even taking into account that we disbanded the Republican Guard and that recruiting stations make great targets for suicide bombers.
(ii) Political compromise once and for all to settle the question of Kurdish regional independence and revenue-sharing of mostly-Kurdish oil with Sunnis and Shiites.
(iii) Real Sunni and Shiite compromise to settle the impression among Sunnis that they're about to get royally fucked.
(iv) A free and fair press (no comment on our own, but let's just say fewer than one story bought-and-paid-for-Aby-Uncle-Sam per week).
That'd be a good start. No advice on how to get there, but my sense is Jesse Jackson could be involved. And I'm only sort of kidding...
Oh, and "stong" is like "strong," only stonger...
66: It's not that I disagree with your i-iv -- if we achieved those goals, I'd be happy to get out, saying "Well done!" But they don't look likely at all. At all. Particularly ii and iii.
My understanding of the question in 54 was that it was more along the lines of: even if our goals aren't achieved, what would make you think that our presence in Iraq wasn't helping any more?
Agree with LB. Still not sure we should leave, for Andrew's reasons.
So we throw our hands up and say, "Bah!"
I entertain this reaction as a possibility, but it's immensely unsatisfying.
Slol, I see what you mean. But I don't think anyone outside certain parts of our government has a good grasp of how well or poorly the development of the Iraqi state is proceeding, especially the development of institutionally loyal military and police forces. Whether we reach point X depends, imho, on whether we can effectively develop and support those forces.
That helps. Point by point:
i) The security forces are abjectly unable to stand up on their own. Many are heavily infiltrated by insurgents, some are merely proxy death squads for various militias, and all of them are deeply distrusted by the population at large. We've been there almost three years now and, by our own military's estimation, have exactly zero batallions that are able to operate unsupported.
ii) The largest oil fields, I believe, are in the Shi'ite south. The Kurds are probably the group best able to defend their own interests, but a "once and for all" solution only lasts until the next regime.
iii) The Sunnis are about to get royally fucked. Everybody knows it. What they have going for them is deep financial backing and lots of military training. Safe to assume they will use the one advantage they retain.
iv) Free and fair press would be nice, but I don't see how our staying or leaving hinges on that.
Well, look. We're not leaving. And we're likely to escalate things again if this civil conflict kicks off a regional nightmare.
73: That would be why, when I read the newspapers these days, I've developed an annoying tendency to rock back and forth while emitting a soft, high-pitched keening sound.
Pop some popcorn and fire up the 5.1-channel home theatre system! Apo's got me convinced we're watching inevitable civil war unfold in glorious high-definition.
No, really: until I read his #72, I was harboring idealistic notions that alll hope was not lost. You broke my will, Apo. Thanks.
Hey, I'm glad I'm getting further from draft likelihood, is all I'm saying.
I don't think anyone outside certain parts of our government has a good grasp of how well or poorly the development of the Iraqi state is proceeding
Let's stipulate this is true. Even so, we can guess what our government thinks by the way they're acting and talking, though. And they don't act and talk as if things were going well. They kept up a pretty relentlessly positive picture for a long time, but they've good and dropped that, haven't they. No more about last throes. So, I don't think they think things are going well.
75: Just doin' my job, yo. My position has always been that civil war was inevitable when Saddam left power, no matter how he left. Just too big of a power vacuum to be filled peacefully. Having 130K+ US troops in the country has delayed it a bit, but I'm not sure it has delayed it very much. Andrew is right that it has kept some of the neighboring states at bay, though by most accounts, Iranian agents are all over the south.
That said, I've been wrong before and perhaps I'm overly pessimistic. However, I don't get anything except a bad feeling about how this is all evolving. A very, very bad feeling.
re #71:
At this point, is it a given that anyone *inside* certain parts has a good grasp of how well or poorly the development of the Iraqi state is proceeding?
I don't think we should remotely believe the implication of I don't think anyone outside certain parts of our government has a good grasp of how well or poorly the development of the Iraqi state is proceeding is true. All evidence, from respected people who have left the Administration, is that the evidence is not determinative, but that viewpoint is.
I think sorting out the outcomes of the current situation is orders of magnitude beyond any model we should have any faith in. I don't think that being on the inside makes any difference to this at all. So people on the inside have an incentive to be courtiers, and that's what we get.
The crux of the issue is this: can the Iraqi state develop sufficient power and institutional loyalty to stand against and eventually destroy its competitors? If it can, and US assistance is necessary to that end (as it undoubtedly would be), then point X will not be reached, and the benefits of staying far outweigh the costs. If it can't, then point X is certain to be reached, and we should consider finding a face-saving excuse to leave.
The only way I would feel hopeful that point X will not be reached is if I felt that anyone in the administration side of the chain of command had:
uno) a clear picture of the actual reality of the current situation on the ground
dos) a deep understanding of the numerous complex issues that stand between the current siutation and our goal of "the Iraqi state develop[ing] sufficient power and institutional loyalty to stand against and eventually destroy its competitors"
tres) a reasonable, workable plan to get us there, and
quatro) the guts to level with the American people and paint a no-rose-colored-glasses picture of exactly what that plan would require.
Instead, we get reassurances that Fredom Is On The March, and we will do Whatever It Takes. I am not reassured. More and more I feel that our situation is like that described in the opening lines of Woody Allen's "My Speech to the Graduates":
More than at any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.