I find those sorts of posts both useful and infuriating.
Oh, good, you got the GHR post I was going to blog but couldn't get myself together to write about.
Sorry: I think GFR's analysis (the only one I've read) is basically right, but it's been more or less obvious from the start of the war. I find it unbelievably maddening that it's taken us nearly four years to get to the point where someone says what's patently obvious. It depresses me about the world in general. And when people are understandably pleased about a post like that, it infuriates me that we're again missing a mistake in the machinery--this took too long.
The idea's been out there and given voice: "if this were really important, we would have had some national sacrifice, not just more shopping," and "they're hyping the threat to serve their own agenda," etc. But I think these three really pull it together and bring it home.
There's an important point there that really needs to get pounded until it's common wisdom. Back when we were getting all the pieces in place for the invasion, I had a conversation with my boss where he repeated the then ubiquitous argument of "I didn't support the invasion, but now that we're there, we can't afford to lose it."
My response at the time was "If we go home now, what do we lose?" He looked at me for a long time, then answered, "I'll have to think about that." When he came back, he'd changed his mind. We've already "lost," inasmuch as there was anything to be won or lost. Leaving now won't make that worse by any stretch, it will only reduce the eventual total cost in lives and dollars. We've done this dance before: leaving Vietnam was a net gain for everybody involved, despite all the dire predictions from the various hawk factions.
I've been saying this since 2003 and while it's nice to see public opinion coming around to that view, it's pretty disheartening that it took the better part of a trillion dollars and who knows how many tens of thousands of dead bodies to get there.
And of course the argument was important years ago, but it's acutely important again now that we're at a point of decision about moving toward withdrawal. This is a moment when we have to recognize that withdrawing will have bad consequences (mostly for the Iraqis), but we shouldn't pretend that it's an existential threat to America.
This is a moment when we have to recognize that withdrawing will have bad consequences (mostly for the Iraqis)
Not worse than what was unleashed by invading in the first place, though. And perhaps not worse than the current status quo, which is pretty hellish.
I have been saying this for years, but not nearly as well, and also from the standpoint of believing in the cause. Trying to reshape the politics of the Middle East on the cheap was doomed to failure. My mistake was believing that the Administration really believed what they were saying, and would make the appropriate commitments. Powell didn't even stand for the Powell Doctrine. Betrayed is how I feel, but I've been there before.
And then after withdrawing you [the US] and we [the Brits] deserve to be treated as international pariahs and ignored on all substantive issues for, well, a long time ...
I don't really know. My guess is that when we leave, conditions are going to heat up from the current hellish but somewhat controlled simmer to boiling all over the stove for at least a while until some stable status quo gels. I think the net over the next decade best outcome for the Iraqis is for us to leave ASAP, because the fastest way to get to something stable is for us to stop interfering, but that doesn't mean the year or two after we leave won't be pretty awful.
Well, it's kinda like the debates that went on during the crafting and passage of NAFTA, when many people were screaming that it would move all sorts of industrial jobs overseas. As Clinton and Gore said at the time, there isn't anything that's going to stop that trend whether NAFTA passes or not; the question is whether there's any lemonade to be made from those lemons. The situation in Iraq has done nothing but deteriorate from Day 1, and it's clear that nothing is on the horizon that's going to change that trend. Withdrawing might speed the process a bit, but it isn't going to fundamentally change it.
Trying to reshape the politics of the Middle East on the cheap was doomed to failure.
I'm pretty sure it would have been doomed to failure even if we'd thrown more money and military power at it. The natives have serious military hardware and modern communications systems these days.
What Luttwak and the others said **should** change things, but the CW is changing very slowly.
Politicians and media people only seem to memorize one set of lines. The Republicans were the fiscally-conservative policy in 1965, and a lot of people think they still are even though they aren't. A reputation for dovishness hurt the Democrats in 1972, 1980, and 1984, so we can never be dovish even if the voters are.
And so on.
A lot of big-time people are just too tarred by the Iraq War to plausibly change their minds. They have to be put out of their misery and replaced. In 2037 Kristol will still be talking about how we would have won in Iraq if people had listened to him.
The basic point about accepting, forthrightly, that the Iraq mission has failed is right.
I don't know about the whole 'disengagement' thing; 'withdrawal' seems to be another one of those unsayables that needs to become sayable. It would be nice if whatever path America takes out of Iraq doesn't potentially mire it in yet further debacles. It worries me to hear people treating "withdraw to Iraqi Kurdistan" as a realistic option, given that the Kurdistan issue has so often been implicated in regional conflicts in Iran and Turkey. (The conceit behind the 'disengagement' argument -- that the US Army is just passively protecting the Shiites from the Sunnis and thus shielding them from "responsibility" -- is also implausible.)
And then after withdrawing you [the US] and we [the Brits] deserve to be treated as international pariahs and ignored on all substantive issues for, well, a long time ...
Amen.
15. I'm not at all sure that the project was doomed to failure. Hell, if the Administration had used its own State Department's plan for after the invasion I think there was a reasonable chance of success. But I am the kind of optimist that thinks people would rather live with liberty rather than tyranny, so what do I know. Having someone tell you what to do every day is certainly easier.
19: I am the kind of optimist that thinks people would rather live with liberty rather than tyranny
And I am the kind of optimist that thinks people can learn that high-flown, patronizing rhetoric about "liberty" and "tyranny" is not a substitute for workable policy.
20. Rhetoric is not a substitute for policy, but neither is the soft bigotry of low expectations for the Arab world. Just because something is hard doesn't mean it is not worth doing.
Really dumb question about 6 from someone too young to remember the aftermath of Vietnam. Didn't South Vietnam get over-run several years after we left? How is that a net gain for everyone involved? I mean, clearly it was the right thing to do to leave, but it seems to have had some not terribly pleasant consequences.
It's not a bad place at all to live these days, is the thing. Turns out not all Communists eat babies.
Okay, let's not get all huffy, not when we've got Hirschman to kick around downpage. I apologize for the snippy tone of my 15, and now I'm going to try to explain myself.
I think it's an enormously problematic endeavor to come into a foreign culture and region to impose a solution to its problems. The goal of "reshaping the Middle East" is basically a giant intervention---military, political, cultural---using very blunt instruments. Not only is that difficult to pull off successfully (lots of moving parts!), but it's very likely that your patient didn't consent to the operation. In a situation like that, the boundaries of freedom and tyranny become very, very gray.
That was flip. But the process of getting overrun wasn't a ghastly, extended, high-casualty war, and while I'm sure there are bad things to say about the Vietnamese government, it's not ridiculously horrible -- we aren't talking North Korea.
GFR writes: Because America's failure in Iraq is not an existential threat to the United States. ... America will go on. No one wants to say this. To say it sounds callous, and awful, and morally bankrupt. And yet it is true.
It's worth noting that if we had airplanes slamming into skyscrapers every single morning since 9/11, killing 3000 people a day, then about 6 million Americans would now be dead -- and that would not, quite, be an existential threat to the United States. To say it sounds callous, and awful, and morally bankrupt. And yet it is true.
In other words, I believe that the Iraqis had to free themselves from Saddam Hussein for that freedom to mean much for them or for it to become the basis for a sustainable political system.
24. But getting there was no picnic. Reeducation camps, Cambodian killing fields, etc. Having the Soviet Union collapse also improved the Vietnamese willingness to do business with their former enemy.
South Vietnam got taken over by the VC, but I'm not sure how that's worse than prolonging the war that killed hundreds of thousands, destroyed infrastructure, and poisoned the country thanks to chemical defoliation. Net gain takes the negative consequences into account.
Cambodian killing fields
IIRC, it was the Vietnamese communists who came in and stopped this.
22: Rhetoric is not a substitute for policy, but neither is the soft bigotry of low expectations for the Arab world.
"Rhetoric is not a substitute for policy, but here's some more empty rhetoric." Come on.
People who want to talk about "the soft bigotry of low expectations" should really learn what the phrase colonial tutelage refers to.
32. That's right, and I'm afraid that the same sort of intervention by a neighboring country after the US pullout will happen in Iraq also.
What's your concern there, TLL? That somebody we don't like might play a role in cleaning up the mess we made?
If Iran annexed a stretch of Iraq filled with desparately poor, interwarring refugees, it might keep 'em busy for awhile.
33. Not exactly "white man's burden", but understanding the pathologies that lead to Bin Ladinism, and trying to change the political climate that allows those pathologies to thrive is certainly a worthy goal, no? Add to that the potential of a devestating mass casualty event at the hands of the non state actors, what is to be done?
But what the hell did any of that have to do with Iraq?
34: What, specifically, would be bad about neighboring country intervention? Which countries should be allowed to intervene, and which should not be allowed?
Here's a more general rhetorical question about Iraq:
What goals are we accomplishing on a daily basis? weekly basis? monthly basis? yearly basis? What exactly are US soldiers doing in Iraq? What is their mission, and how can they accomplish it?
35. Long term, probably a net benefit, like Viet Nam. Short term, who knows. Personally I like our chances long term with Iran, because I don't see the Mullahs in charge much longer. (Not this summer, though). But our good intentions have poisoned the well for a long time because of the poor execution.
38: trying to change the political climate that allows those pathologies to thrive is certainly a worthy goal, no?
Absolutely. For example, changing the patronizing attitude that assume we know what's better for the Arab world than it does is a worthy goal, as is ramping down the pre-inclination to military intervention (not to mention outright foreign occupation) that fuels the fortunes of bin Laden as his ilk. These would be good things to do.
39. You're not thinking "big picture" LB. Iraq was invaded because we had cassus belli, however tenuous. It had to happen when it did because the sanctions regime was crumbling. Had the invasion not occurred, we would have brought the troops home. Would that have been a bad thing? Certainly not to all the people who have suffered and died since then. But the real goal is to have regime change in Iran and Syria, and regime modification in KSA in the relatively short term. I am in full agreement that if this is in fact the goal, was the invasion the "best" way to achieve the goal, the "least bad" or the "only" way is a debate that should have but did not occur.
Likewise, I'd like to discuss whether setting my office on fire is the best way, or even the least bad way, for me to get a cup of coffee. Under the current circumstances, I don't have any coffee. The situation's got to be shaken up for me to get some caffeine into me, and setting my office on fire would set fundamental changes in motion.
But I am the kind of optimist that thinks people would rather live with liberty rather than tyranny
You'd have to go with some pretty convoluted definitions of those two words (or alternately, no definitions at all) to argue that what we've done in Iraq is removing tyranny and implanting liberty. It's just the opposite and although I can defend this statement I find it unnecessary and totally depressing. But Jesus, if this is liberty, then give me slavery instead.
45. I think that the Red Cross will bring some coffee after your office burns down, so there is that.
Not exactly "white man's burden", but understanding the pathologies that lead to Bin Ladinism, and trying to change the political climate that allows those pathologies to thrive is certainly a worthy goal, no?
Yes. So why are we doing exactly the opposite? Surely, this far down the line, nobody could possibly argue that the American presence in Iraq is doing anything besides encouraging those pathologies, and, dare I say, vindicating them?
45: LB, sure, your office is on fire now, but putting the fire out isn't going to get you a cup of coffee at this point. You need to show your commitment to getting a cup of coffee, and setting your neighbor's office on fire is a good first step in that direction.
47. If by opposite you mean that living in Sadaam's Iraq was liberty, you and I certaily have different definitions. Security, certainly, but not liberty. And I am in no way trying to say that the current situation in Iraq has accomplished the goal, not even close.
I'm re-orienting the discourse--teh awesome! Hmm, will this be priceless like a mother's love, or the good kind of priceless?
53: Liberty isn't an either/or thing, it's a continuum. Is there more liberty in Iraq today than there was five years ago? If you believe there is, then I would truly like to know what you think liberty is.
Hmm, will this be priceless like a mother's love, or the good kind of priceless?
The kind of priceless that, with just four additional dollars, would enable you to buy LB a big old latte at Starbucks.
52: If the whole block goes up in flames, later on she can plant coffee, harvest the beans, and thus have her coffee and sell it too.
i am going to go out on a limb here and try to change the nature of the debate. Part of the reason we invaded Iraq is because we could. Our troops were there, and we have the capacity to keep them there indefinately. But what would our foreign policy look like if we did not have such a capable force. Two carrier battle groups instead of ten, and two divisions of army troops, or whatever. The temptation to fix everything is very American, and after WWII we had the capacity to try. But why? Why should we care who kills whom in the rest of the world? Certainly bad things happen that we can't influence, but should we try.
One of biggest disillusionments of my young political life has been the trajectory of Russia. I remember playing Raisa Gorbachov Comes To Washington with my dolls. I remember my cranky old HS European History teacher claim that the Russian Revolution didn't work out as Marx would have predicted because the Russians were used to be ruled by autocrats and thinking to myself that that was a horrible thing to say. I remember how exciting the attempted coup was, and how wonderful it was that Yeltsin became President in some semblance of an orderly transition of power. And then the utter devastation of the economy, the corrupt incompetance of Yeltsin, and the resurgence of the Communist Party, and then the rise of Putin. And now look at it.
I'm not cynical enough to believe that Russians like being ruled by autocrats, but I'm sure not naive enough any longer to believe that tearing down a wall immediately creates a free, open society.
57: That coffee wants to be in LB's cup, and a little office fire like this isn't going to stop it. So we need to go buy a little more gasoline to keep the fire going. You do support the fire, don't you?
No, I'm opposed to the fire, but I still support the embers. I don't know why you can't understand this.
63: Ssssh! Don't tell ogged.
I do not believe that democratizing the Middle East has ever been a goal of US policy. Some on government may have yalked themselves into thinking it might really be a spinoff, but it was never the motivater. It was used from time to time as a public justification, but those guys switched public justifications according to convenience and the changing facts on the ground.
At this point I just do not think it is reasonable for anyone to take the Iraq War, in its present form or any earlier form, at face value. Either it was just a stupid blunder, or the reasons given for it were different than the real reasons, or both.
The kind of priceless that, with just four additional dollars, would enable you to buy LB a big old latte at Starbucks.
You're forgetting about the budget I would need to hire the arsonist.
. The temptation to fix everything is very American, and after WWII we had the capacity to try. But why? Why should we care who kills whom in the rest of the world? Certainly bad things happen that we can't influence, but should we try.
This is really a big part of the issue for me. People have a tendency to idealize their motivations, the constancy of their motivations, and the connection between their explicit or conscious motivations and the decisions they make. This is a form of the "will" game.
We try to fix things for decent and also self-interested reasons. But dollars to doughnuts says that when things go to hell, people throw out the decent reasons and, even if they don't realize it themselves, go with the self-interested reasons to guide future actions (as best as they can understand what's in their self-interest). No small part of the problem is that we continually want to code things in terms of heroism and noble ideals, etc. It confuses things and yields sloppy and soppy decisions.
Now we've got the smoldering ruins of an office, and still no coffee, but if we abandon course, these computers will have melted in vain.
Wait a second, where the fuck is *my* coffee? With all the energy you lot are putting into LB's burning office, you could have provided coffee to me and everyone else who needs a second cup right about now.
Those computers were mindless mercenaries, so who cares if they are now melted.
All that's left now is for us to get hell out of the office and allow what's left of the network to partition itself into a loose confederation of OSX, Windows, and Linux autonomous regions.
58: Our troops were there, and we have the capacity to keep them there indefinately.
Well, at least as long as the dollar continues to defy gravity, anyway. About which opinions vary.
But what would our foreign policy look like if we did not have such a capable force.
It would presumably be much more cautious about committing to overseas ventures unless there was some direct and serious threat at stake. Which looks like it wouldn't be a bad thing.
Offtopic: my back had been killing me for about the last two weeks -- constantly in pain and a huge knot in my shoulder. I'd tried all kinds of things and it wouldn't go away. Today I realized that my chair had been lowered about an inch more than it used to be. I raised it up and the back pain went away instantly.
Voila!
71: But if we don't watch & guard them they'll be turned into a botnet by a spammer.
74: Backed by the Pakispami intelligence services, of course.
Actually, I was really hoping to get through the day without "-ist"-ing you, B. So strike 75 and pretend I said "get your own damn cup of coffee instead of asking for a handout, hippie."
Oh, and do you have any spare change? I'm out of half-and-half.
You're just so oppressable, though.
73: I used to get terrible back pains after driving for more than an hour or two. After years of this, I had occasion to move my seat forward a bit to accommodate a tall person in the back. No pain ever since, even on twenty-hour (no diaper) pushes. It pays to experiment.
If I had a dime for every blog post that would have re-oriented the discourse if anyone important had actually paid any attention to it, then I'd have a lot of dimes.
I've had mysterious back pain that turned out to be caused by sitting on a too-thick wallet. Amazing the little things that can make a big difference.
81: Doesn't a 20-hour push with no diaper get pretty messy?
caused by sitting on a too-thick wallet
Whine, whine, whine.
"I remember playing Raisa Gorbachov Comes To Washington with my dolls."
I love JM.
84: Not necessarily. Unless of course you think of kids as messy. Which actually they are. So never mind.
Thanks for clearing that up.
85: Believe me, it wasn't cash that was making it too thick.
88: I am NOT clearing that up. It's someone else's turn.
Yeah, if there's one thing B isn't, it's untouchable.
90: PK's babymama, perhaps?
I humbly suggest a 'nym change to BrahminPhD.
Actually I'm having an internal struggle over whether I should clean the kitchen before the babysitter comes over at 3 pm. Goddamnfucking suburban norms.
I used to babysit for a family that always had a dirty kitchen when I arrived. I was appalled at the time, but the memory gives me comfort now.
86.--That game didn't last nearly as long as our French Revolution games or our Pioneer games. Somehow, Raisa's voyages didn't provide much narrative momentum, and of course there weren't that many roles.
46: There's nothing tastier than a good creme de cassis belli. Very expensive, but goes down so smooth after a hard day of colonial tutelage.
I mostly agree with the linked articles but I find Marshall's claim that the United States failed but was not defeated in Iraq, unsupportable (although perhaps politically expedient). The "other party" that defeated the United States is the jihadists. They wanted the United States to fail, conceived a rational strategy (use terroristic tactics to aggravate existing problems in Iraq) to cause the United States to fail and successfully implemented that strategy. Looks like a defeat to me.
I also think Luttwak et al are a bit sanguine about the likely effects of withdrawing now. Sure a rosy scenario is possible but you could also end with an Iraq Iran war type situation which dragged on and on for years in a bloody inconclusive stalemate.
26
The Khemer Rouge on the other hand were ridiculously horrible.
an Iraq Iran war type situation which dragged on and on for years in a bloody inconclusive stalemate
They're already there, wouldn't you say?
102
Not quite, for example you haven't had most of Baghdad destroyed by artillery (like Kabul reportedly was) yet.
We have failed to secure coffee our coffee, but we believe that contracting some of the work out to Starbucks will give us just the frothy surge we need.
100: not defeated
I think that's just the usual comment made about what happens when the other guy makes full contact with the US military. We don't lose those. It's too bad our fearless leader thought it was all that was required to "win".
This sounds like a good position. I think my main hesitation in vehemently campaigning for it is a lack of familiarity with solid first order, first hand evidence and analysis making an airtight case that it will in fact be better for them in the long run. It's all very well for smart bloggers and Washington-based journalists to assert so, but I've yet to see a good summary of the primary--and only primary-- sources on the subject--demographic surveys, geographic surveys, data-analysis of the pattern of bombings and riots, analysis by non-Americans, analysis by on-the-ground journalists, military testimony, gleanings from on-the-ground warbloggers. etc. Anybody?
I'm not following you. Any estimation of what's going to be better for them in the long run depends on knowing what's going to happen when we leave, and that's not terribly amenable to the sort of data-gathering you seem to be talking about. Polls do show that Iraqis generally want us gone, so they think they'd be better off without us, if that helps.
107
I think 106 is intended to be some sort of parody but it is rather obscure.
Not at all, I'm quite serious. Of course we can't get a good model of what will happen. But I'm sure people have some model, and it's built on primary source data. I just feel like that by the time a schmoe like me gets exposed to the conclusions of that model, the primary data is terribly diluted by so much opinionating and analysis-at-adistance.
It's hard for me to scrape the take home points and create a portable case in my mind. I want a specific, focused, carry-home case for why the United States disengaging is probably good for Iraq in the long run, and I want that case to be grounded in evidence and facts that are clearly based in today's Iraq. Polling results wuld be one thing. A non-correlation between the presence of American troops and civilian safety would be another. Like that.
109
Ok, sorry. As for your question we have no real idea of what will happen if we go or if we stay. Presumedly the current situation is not what we expected when we went into Iraq. And how did staying become the default position anyway? Personally I would require an airtight case for staying, not leaving, considering how our meddling has worked out so far.
In any case I don't think this sould be the primary consideration, I think we should get out of Iraq because it is good for us not because I am confident that it will be good for Iraq. However if I recall correctly polls show most Iraqis would like us to leave which presumedly should count for something.
Well, I'm not saying it should be our default case, or barring this case, we shouldn't leave. But I feel like I hear this case--"It would be good for them if we left too"--being at least implied a lot, and if it can be made, I'd like to understand it.
Polling data is good.
Although polling data is also suspect without a lot of supporting data; Quebecois independence is one example of this, purported support for various government programs is another.
111
Here is an account of a poll showing most Iraqis want us out.
I don't think an airtight case can be made that withdrawing would benefit Iraq. However many people who oppose staying want to believe leaving would benefit Iraq as well as the United States for the same reason that many people who oppose affirmative action want to believe that it hurts minorities, it makes their position seem less selfish.
113:
alright, I was being ambitious with airtight. I meant. . . .reasonable and reality-based. I'm trying to get away from exactly that sort of self-fooling.
Regarding your analogy (cough), I've actually spent a lot of time recently bitching about how the abolishment of affirmative action at Ile U. is, 10 years later, making its unpleasant consequences felt in my social and professional life. I haven't really gotten down to analyzing why or how, but I viscerally feel the lack of diversity in my life as college-derived social circles trump over high-school and family-derived ones--and I viscerally feel that it is a bad, bad thing.
114
Reasonable and reality based, ok, first note that continued involvement in Iraq will not be managed by you or me but by George W. Bush and there is reason to doubt he has the wisdom to employ US power constructively.
Second, Bush bashing aside, it is inherently difficult for the United States to act constructively in Iraq because of the very different cultures. This makes it hard for the United States to understand how Iraqis will react to what we do. It also means many Iraqis will reflexively oppose everything the United States tries to do. Finally domestic political considerations mean it is unlikely the United States will even be trying to do what is best for Iraq.
Consider also the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. Perhaps in theory this could have accomplished something constructive but in practice it hasn't worked out very well.
However the case for withdrawal as good for Iraq is definitely of the lesser evil variety. Things are likely to be very bad either way.
"Every day, violence displaces an estimated 1,300 more Iraqis in the country; every month, at least 40,000."
This is no liberty.